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Union Representation Election Statements:
A Call for Implementation of the Statute
Since its creation in 1935, the National Labor Relations Board' has
recognized the congressional policy of restricting campaign speech in
union representation elections. The congressional goal has been to pro-
tect employee-voters from the effects of misrepresentations. 2 Originally,
only employers' speech was restricted, for Congress wanted to encourage
the growth of unions.3 In 1947, however, Congress amended the National
Labor Relations Act so as to forbid certain types of expression by unions
as well as employers.
4
Nevertheless, the NLRB has persisted in granting unions greater
latitude in this area than it has given employers. The Board removed
campaign speech from the domain of section 8(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, which outlaws speech containing a threat of reprisal or
force, or promise of benefit.' It also developed a standard which gave the
Board wide discretion in determining whether a misrepresentation
during a campaign has had an impact on employees significant enough to
warrant setting aside the election result. This exercise of discretion has
allowed the Board to favor unions over employers in misrepresentation
cases.
Recently, the Board has questioned, rejected6 and readopted7 this
standard. In its opinions, the Board has concentrated on employees' need
for protection from campaign misrepresentations. Yet the NLRA has
already settled this issue, for it recognizes this need and restricts both
erpployers' and unions' speech. The issue is whether the Board should be
allowed to continue to disregard the NLRA and substitute its own discre-
tionary standards which have favored unions.
'The National Labor Relations Board was. created by the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act, ch. 372, §§ 3, 4, 10, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 65
Stat. 601 (1951), 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 88 Stat. 395 1974) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 - 169 (1976)). The function of the Board was to administer both the un-
fair labor practice and the representation provisions of the NLRA.
2A. Cox. D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 83 (8th ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as A. Cox].
lid.
'Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, §§ 8, 9, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
158, 159 (1976)). Only those amendments found at 61 Stat. 140-46 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158,
159 (1976) are relevant to this note. These amendments were intended to allow employers
as well as unions to comment in union representation elections, and provided parallel
limitations on both employers' and unions' campaign speech.
Section 8 of the Wagner Act applied only to employers. With the adoption of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the employer-related provisions became § 8(a) and the union-related provi-
sions constituted § 8(b).
5See note 26 infra.6Shopping Kart Food Mkt., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
7General Knit, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (Dec. 6, 1978).
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This note calls for the NLRB to reconsider its present policy of ap-
plying its self-developed standards and to develop guidelines consistent
with section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act. Although
misrepresentations can be made in a variety of ways, this note focuses on
speech in representation elections.
ELECTIONS UNDER THE WAGNER ACT
The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935 establishes the
rights of employees to organize and to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing.8 Section 8 of the Act 9 identifies
behavior constituting unfair labor practices. In the Senate committee
report on the Wagner Act, major emphasis was placed on the need to in-
crease the bargaining power of the workers;10 to do this, it was said the
government would have to protect and assist unions." It was no surprise,
then, that the provisions of section 8 focused on employers' actions.
The Board interpreted section 8 as prohibiting any employer's action
that might discourage union membership.1 2 Construed in this manner,
section 8(a)(1) limited the employer's freedom of speech in his dealings
with employees, as the employer was prohibited from making any com-
ment concerning unions, especially as to their desirability and rights.13
Providing management the opportunity to express its views was con-
sidered unimportant, as the choice of a representative was seen as the ex-
clusive concern of the employees and the union.1 4 A strict rule was el-
forced which considered any pre-election anti-union speech as an unfair
labor practice and a ground for setting aside the election. 15
'Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, to join
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection." Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)).
Despite its adoption in 1935, it was not until 1937 that the Wagner Act took full force
and effect of law. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of the Act. See A. Cox. supra note 2, at 84-86; H.
METZ, LABOR POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 23-24 (1945); H. MILLIS & E. BROWN.
FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 35-40 (1950).
'Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976)).
10S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1935).
"National Labor Relations BoardL- Hearings on S. 195 Before the Senate Comm. on
Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1935) (statement of William Green).
"See H. METZ, supra note 8, at 33-34.
"H. METZ & H. JACOBSTEIN, A NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 72 (1947). The Board has held
that an admittedly correct statement of employees' rights under the NLRA was a violation
of § 8(1) (presently § 8(a)(1), see note 4 supra). H. METZ. LABOR POLICY OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 23, 34 (1945); Mock-Judson-Voehringer Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 133, 136 (1938).
14 R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS & K. HUHN. NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT 17 (Univ.
of Pa. Wharton School Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 8, 1974) [hereinafter
cited as R. WILLIAMS].
"Id. See, e.g., Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 501 (1939); Virginia Ferry




In contrast, restrictions on union speech were virtually nonexistent.
The Board stated in 1945: "Absent violence, we have never undertaken
to police union organization or union campaigns, to weigh the truth or
falsehood of official union utterances, or to curb the enthusiastic efforts
of employee adherents to the union cause in winning others to their con-
viction. ' 16 The only concern was that employees "did not vote under
actual coercion or duress. '17 The Board reasoned that "[e]mployees un-
doubtedly recognize [campaign] propaganda for what it is, and discount
it.,,,8
TAFT-HARTLEY AND THE BOARD'S RESPONSE
Through the end of the decade, unions gained in both number and
power. With the onset of World War II, the government, in order to
strengthen its war effort, sought the full cooperation of organized labor. 19
Union involvement in government, along with the publicity which accom-
panied that involvement, gave unions a governmental stamp of
approval.20 Additionally, the policies of the War Labor Board encouraged
collective bargaining and strengthened the unions' role in the plants. 21
These factors contributed heavily to union growth and the spread of col-
lective bargaining.2
2
By the end of the war, the coal mining, construction, railroad and
trucking unions were powerful. 23 In 1947, over both the vehement objec-
tions of organized labor and a presidential veto, Congress passed the
Taft-Hartley Act,2 4 an attempt "to ensure greater latitude to employers
in speaking against unionization in election campaigns. ' 25 Section 8(c) of
the new Act limited the scope of prohibited employer speech to that
which contained a threat of reprisal or force or a promise of benefit.2 6
"Maywood Hosiery Mills, 64 N.L.R.B. 146, 150 (1945). See also Curtiss-Wright Corp., 43
N.L.R.B. 795, 797 n.2 (1942) (election sustained despite false claim by one of two competing
unions that it was not bound by wartime agreement renouncing overtime pay whereas its
rival was); Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1441, 1442 (1944) (election sustained despite
false claim by one of two competing unions that it had NLRB approval whereas its rival
did not).
17R. WILLIAMS. supra note 14, at 18, citing Curtiss-Wright Corp., 43 N.L.R.B. 795, 797
(1942).
"Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1441, 1442 (1944).





'Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, §§ 8, 9, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§158, 159 (1976)).
25See Note, Shopping Kart: The Need for a Broader Approach to the Problem of Cam-
paign Regulation, 56 N.C.L. REv. 389, 392 (1978).
6Section 8(c) states:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not con-
stitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions
1979]
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The Board responded the next year in General Shoe Corp.2 7 by ex-
empting all campaign speech from examination under section 8(c) and
claiming jurisdiction over it under the Board's section 9(c) power to pre-
scribe regulations for representation elections. 8 While the language of
9(c) grants the Board power to promulgate regulations in this area, it
does not give the Board power to override section 8(c). The NLRB did
need the authority to develop some regulations in order to implement the
Taft-Hartley amendments, but the purpose of this grant could not have
been to allow the Board to circumvent those amendments. Nevertheless,
the Board declared that its duty was to provide
a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the
uninhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to establish
those conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they
have been fulfilled. When... the standard drops too low.., the
requisite laboratory conditions are not present and the experi-
ment must be conducted over again.29
The adoption of this test signaled a major policy change on the part of the
Board, which would now apply a stricter standard to all parties. Rather
than allowing employers the same free rein concerning campaign speech
that unions had enjoyed, the Board preferred to place restrictions on
union speech. 0
The impact of the "laboratory conditions" standard was first clearly
evidenced in Merck and Co.,3 where the Board spelled out its new posi-
tion concerning the employee-voter's ability to decipher campaign prop-
aganda. While noting that the campaign statements involved were "ob-
vious propaganda, clearly recognizable as such by the employees," the
Board held that it would not police union campaigns or consider the
veracity of union utterances unless employees' freedom of choice was
of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or pro-
mise of benefit.
Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 8(c), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)
(1976)).
2777 N.L.R.B. 124 (1946).
2
"Section 9(c) states in relevant part: "Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in ac-
cordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board .... Taft-Hartley Act,
ch. 120, § 9(c), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976)). The
Supreme Court has interpreted this language as giving the Board authority to promulgate
regulations to insure a fair election. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 37 (1942);
NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940).
2977 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1946).
30R. WILLIAMS. supra note 14, at 20.
31104 N.L.R.B. 891 (1953). In United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 104 (1953), the
Board had indicated that misrepresentations that were not so misleading as to prevent the
exercise of employees' free choice in the selection of a bargaining representative might be
excused as legitimate campaign propaganda. See also Kearney & Trecker Corp., 96
N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951); Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 349 (1945).
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substantially impaired.32 Two years later, in Gummed Products Co.,33 the
Board clearly indicated that substantial impairment constituted a vio-
lation of laboratory conditions.
ELECTIONS UNDER THE HOLLYWOOD CERAMICS STANDARD
The Board did not intend the "laboratory conditions" language to be
taken literally; it stated in various opinions that elections "do not occur
in a laboratory" and that "elections ... should not be judged against
theoretically ideal, but nevertheless artificial standards. 3 4 Instead, it
hoped to develop a flexible standard and to determine whether in a given
case the facts came sufficiently close to the standard utilized.3 5 The
courts, however, fearing abuse of discretion by the Board, were intent on
applying the standard more rigorously.3 6 As a result, there was frequent
conflict between the Board and the courts.
3 7
In 1962, the Board modified its position on the regulation of campaign
behavior. In Hollywood Ceramics,38 the Board determined that
employees needed greater protection. In determining whether the
laboratory conditions had been violated, the Board declared that its duty
would be to balance "the right of the employees to an untrammeled
choice... [against] the right of the parties to wage a free and vigorous
campaign with all the normal legitimate tools of electioneering. 3 9 The
Board recognized that, since union campaigns are often hotly contested,
"a party may, in its zeal, overstate its own virtues and the vices of the
other," and since complete honesty is not always attainable nor "ex-
pected by employees," these misstatements do not necessarily impair
laboratory conditions.40 The formula utilized in striking this balance was
as follows:
We believe that an election should be set aside only where
there has been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign
trickery, which involves a substantial departure from the
truth, at a time which prevents the other party or parties from
making an effective reply, so that the misrepresentation,
whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to have
a significant impact on the election.41
32Merck & Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 891, 892 (1953).
"112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1093-94 (1955).
"Liberal Mkt. Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1481, 1482 (1957). See also Morganton Full Fashioned
Hosiery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1534, 1538 (1954).
3'See R. WILLIAMS. supra note 14, at 25.
3"See id. at 23-24.
37See Phalen, The Demise of Hollywood Ceramics: Fact and Fantasy, 46 U. CIN. L. REV.
450, 453-54 (1977).
3140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
"1Id. at 224.4Od. at 223-24, citing Celanese Corp. of America, 121 N.L.R.B. 303 (1958).
"Id. at 224. For criticisms of the standard, see Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics
In Renresentation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act 78 HARV. L. REV. 38.
85 (1964); R. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 60, 61.
671.•1979l
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At a time when the Board might have acted to alleviate the courts' con-
cern by developing a less subjective test, it developed a standard calling
for wider Board discretion. Consequently, the tension continued,
resulting in court reversals of Board decisions favoring unions. 42
The Board adhered to this standard for more than a decade. It was not
until a 1973 decision, Modine Manufacturing Co.,4 3 that the Board's view
of employees' ability to deal with campaign propaganda evidenced
change. In Modine, the Board, while reaffirming the Hollywood Ceramics
standard, noted that employees' sophistication in matters concerning
representation elections had risen substantially.44
Board Member John Penello indicated in a footnote45 that it was time
to abandon this standard, although Modine was not the case in which to
do so. His views were more fully expressed in later cases, in which he
argued in dissent that the Board had no obligation "to protect voters
from their own gullibility," 46 and that the Board's continued adherence to
Hollywood Ceramics was based on an erroneous assumption of
employees' sophistication and was "misguided paternalism. ' ' 47
SHOPPING KART AND THE GETMAN STUDY
Penello's views became NLRB policy in Shopping Kart Food Market,
Inc.48 where it was decided that the Board would no longer probe into the
truth or falsity of campaign statements, or set aside elections on the
basis of misleading campaign statements.49 Elections would continue to
be invalidated as a result of forgeries and misrepresentations about the
Board's processes.9 0 This action, overruling Hollywood Ceramics, was
based on an empirical study by researchers Getman and Goldberg5'
which purportedly demonstrated that campaigns have a minimal effect
on voter preference in union elections. This conclusion was contrary to
the Board's previous assumptions that campaign propaganda interferes
with employees' freedom of choice and that employees are naive.5 2 Thus,
"For a commentary on the Board's inconsistent application of this standard, see J.
GETMAN. S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN. UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALI-
TY 21-26 (1976) [hereinafter cited as J. GETMAN]. See also Phalen, supra note 37, at 453-54.
41203 N.L.R.B. 527 (1973).
"Id. at 530.
'Id. at 530 n.6.
4'Medical Ancillary Services, 212 N.L.R.B. 582 (1974), supplementing 195 N.L.R.B. 290
(1972), rev'd and remanded, 478 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1973).
47Ereno Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239, 243 (1975). See Phalen, supra note 37, at 454-56;
Penelo, Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.: The Cure for the Hollywood Ceramics Malaise,
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 464 (1977).
48228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
41Id. at 1313.
50Id.
"Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB Regulation of
Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976), also
reported in J. GETMAN. supra note 42, at 33. See Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 1311. 1313 (1977).
"Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313.
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the assumed need for the Board to protect employees was made to appear
greatly overrated. Yet the study, while gaining much-deserved recog-
nition for its pioneering attempt to determine the validity of the Board's
assumptions, was also the subject of criticism. 3
The study was performed in two parts. The first examined NLRB deci-
sions related to union elections, and noted several Board assumptions
regarding campaign behavior which reveal a general view of the employee
as particularly susceptible to campaign statements. 54 The second part of
the study, designed to test these assumptions, was a survey of employees
involved in thirty-one contested representation elections.
5
The value of the study was unfortunately weakened by two major
shortcomings. First, the researchers failed to include a group of voters
who were involved in an uncontested election, 6 making it difficult to
determine how much of the change in voters' preference was due to the
campaign, and how much was the result of misrepresentations. What
renders this so damaging is that the study did not attempt to determine
any other cause of the shift.
5 7
Second, the study reported that in order to maximize predictability of
"For criticisms, see Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade
Unionist's Point of View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1976); Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 1311, 1315-18 (1977) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting;, Fanning, Member, dissenting
in part). For favorable responses, see Flanagan, The Behavioral Foundations of Union
Election Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1195 (1976); Raskin, Deregulation of Union Cam-
paigns: Restoring the First Amendment Balance, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (1976); Goetz &
Wike, Book Review, 25 KAN. L. REV. 375 (1977).
The conclusion that campaign violations have minimal influence on voters is not consist-
ent with two previous studies of rerun elections showing the probability of a different out-
come in a rerun depends partially on the type of violation reported in the first election. See
Dronting, NLRB Remedies for Election Misconduc" An Analysis of Election Outcomes
and Their Determinants, 40 U. CHI. J. Bus. 137 (1967); Pollitt, NLRB Re-run Elections: A
Study, 41 N.C.L. REV. 209 (1963).
Yet, there is evidence that the study's general conclusions agree with those of more
limited studies of voting behavior. See Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail Workers Toward
Union Organization, 18 LAB. L.J. 149 (1967) (primary determinants of employee voting are
previous union experience, general perception about unions and job satisfaction); Com-
ment, An Examination of Two Aspects of the NLRB Representation Election: Employee
Attitude and Board Inference, 3 AKRON L. REV. 218 (1970) (positive experiences with
management, satisfaction with working conditions and perception of personal job security
are most crucial in voting choice).
"'The six assumptions discerned by the study were: that employees are attentive to the
campaign; that employees will interpret ambiguous statements by the employer as threats
of reprisals or promises of benefit; that employees are unsophisticated about labor rela-
tions; that free choice is fragile; that limited union campaigning on company premises is
adequate; and, that authorization card signing is an indication of employee choice. J.
GETMAN, supra note 42, at 7-14. Part I is also reported in Getman, Goldberg & Herman,
NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board
Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1470-82 (1975).
"1J. GETMAN, supra note 42, at 33; also reported in Getman & Goldberg, supra note 51.
"Eames, supra note 53, at 1182. This group is called a control group. In this study, the
shift noted in the groups studied would be compared to that in the control group. The dif-
ference would be the amount of shift attributable to the misrepresentations.
571d. at 1182-87. Eames writes, "I believe this missing link is crucially important, that it
in itself rebuts the conclusion that the campaign does not make a significant difference as
to the election results." Id. at 1186-87.
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the findings, a variety of businesses, unions, unit sizes and communities
were included.58 With a sample size of only thirty-one, obtaining adequate
coverage of even two of these four categories would be difficult. This was
borne out by the final report of the study, where there was often only one
representative per subdivision of each of the above categories. 9 Hence, it
is questionable whether the results accurately reflect the general popu-
lation.60
By allowing a single piece of research to be the basis of a major policy
change, the Boardl in Shopping Kart made a decision which was un-
justified.
THE RETURN TO HOLLYWOOD CERAMICS: GENERAL KNIT
The Board had followed Shopping Kart for only eighteen months when
it overruled itself in General Knit.61 In that case, the union seeking
representation had distributed a leaflet on election morning. The
message it contained was ambiguously worded, indicating that either the
employer or its parent company had made a profit of $19.3 million the
preceeding year. The employer filed objections with the NLRB Regional
Director, who determined, under the Shopping Kart standard, that even
if the alleged misrepresentation did refer to the employer, it did not war-
rant setting aside the election. The Board reversed, however, holding
that "the principle ... [set forth] in Shopping Kart is inconsistent with
our responsibility to insure fair elections," and reinstated the standard
set forth in Hollywood Ceramics."
The majority noted that the Hollywood Ceramics standard recognizes
employees' ability to evaluate most campaign information, but that there
are circumstances in which a misrepresentation may materially affect an
election.63 Specifically, the majority pointed out that "employees should
be afforded a degree of protection from overzealous campaigners who
distort the issues by substantial misstatements of relevant and material
facts within the special knowledge of the campaigner."
64
The Board indicated that there were some problems with the
Hollywood Ceramics test. The first was the lack of predictability due to
the standard's subjective nature. While acknowledging this problem, the
Board failed to answer it satisfactorily.65 The second problem was that
58J. GETMAN. supra note 42, at 34.
1IL at 34-36.
6GAs it is not reported that the clusters utilized are heterogeneous, it is not possible to
determine the effect of sampling error on the results. For a discussion of cluster sampling,
the technique utilized in the study, see H. BLALOCK,SOCIAL STATISTICS 523-27 (1972). See
also Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1316 (1977).
61239 N.L.R.B. No. 101. 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (Dec. 6. 1978).
6239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, slip op. at 4, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687, 1688-89 (Dec. 6, 1978).
63Id at 6, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1688-89.
641d (quoting Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1315 (1977)(emphasis
deleted)).
6Id. at 12-13, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1690. The majority states:
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the Hollywood Ceramics process of appeals led to a delay of the election
result. In the case of employers' appeals, this prevents or postpones col-
lective bargaining between the parties, undermining the function of the
employees' chosen bargaining representatives. 6 The Board labeled this
latter concern as "greatly exaggerated." 67 It noted that only nine of the
307 cases" processed in 1976 were appealed to the circuit courts.6 9 Addi-
tionally, "such delay occurs whenever an appeal is taken or enforcement
is sought of a Board Order, and is not peculiar to Hollywood Ceramics
cases."
70
Yet, the majority asserted that this standard had been "well accepted
by the courts and by the parties who have used our election procedure, '71
noting that only forty-seven cases stemming from over one hundred
thousand elections had been reversed.72 However, dissenting Member
Penelo noted that the forty-seven reversals constituted approximately
fifty percent of the campaign misrepresentation cases which had been ap-
pealed to the circuit courts.7 3 This high reversal rate leads to two obser-
vations. First, the courts and the Board diverged in their application of
the Hollywood Ceramics standard. Second, the courts reverse only six-
teen percent of all Board orders, 74 while they have denied Board bargain-
ing orders fifty percent of the time.75 This may indicate that the courts
view the Board's application of the standard as favoring unions,76 and
that the courts desire to implement the NLRA in the manner prescribed
by Congress.
CONCLUSION
The Board, by developing its own standards through a debatable exer-
cise of statutory authority, has yet to implement fully the Taft-Hartley
[A]ny inconsistencies in the results ... have stemmed from judgmental dif-
ferences as to the reasonable effect of a misrepresentation on the electorate,
not from any fundamental difference in the standards or from any desire to
regulate the conduct of one party more closely than that of another. In any
event, our primary focus is on the future application of this standard and not
on the past.
"'In the case of union appeals, there is no postponement or delay of bargaining with the
representative since such an appeal would generally follow a union loss.
"7General Knit, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, slip op. at 13, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687, 1691 (Dec. 6,
1978).
6Id at 7 n.13, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1689 n.13.
6"Id. at 7-8, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1691.70Id. at 4 n.28, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1691 n.28.
71Id. at 7-8, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1689.
72 1d. at 8 n.14, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1689 n.14.
73I& at 22-23, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1693-94.
7142 NLRB ANN. REP. 261 (1977).
"1239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, slip op. at 22-23, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1693.
"See J. GETMAN. supra note 42, at 21-26; Christenson, Free Speech, Propaganda and the
National Labor Relations Act 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 243, 255-63 (1963). For a compilation of
cases that enforced the policy of strict employer noninterference, see Note, Limitations
Upon an Employer's Right of Noncoercive Free Speech, 38 VA. L. REV. 1037 (1952).
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amendments. The Board must cease vacillating among standards it has
created, and follow the standard established by Congress which calls for
equal restrictions on both employers' and unions' campaign speech. The
changes in standards which have occurred over the past three years serve
only to cause bargaining instability. The Board should return campaign
speech to the domain of section 8(c). It could then use the standard set
forth in that section, specifically, that campaign speech containing a
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit shall constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice.
By reversing a high percentage of Board decisions in this area, the
courts continue to sound a warning that the former congressional policy
of restricting employers' speech for the purpose of encouraging union for-
mation has given way to one of protecting employees from both
employers' and unions' campaign speech. The time is ripe for devel-
opment of a standard to be applied in this area based on section 8(c) of the
NLRA. The Board must then recognize its duty to apply that standard to
both employers and organized labor equally, consistent with the intent of
the Taft-Hartley amendments.
BRUCE CHARLES NAVARRO
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